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# Heading for the Brexit

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# Agenda

- **UK Economic Outlook**

Ross Walker, Head of UK & European Economics

- **An American Cycle**

Giles Gale, Head of European Rates Strategy

- **Concerns for Insurers**

Andrew Kenyon FIA, UK Insurance Origination & Solutions



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# UK Economic Outlook


**Ross Walker**

Head of UK & European Economics

02 October 2018

# UK | Economic Rebalancing

- **GDP EXPENDITURE components:** Clearer evidence in recent years of shift from consumption-led growth to investment and net exports (albeit within the context of slowing growth post-EU referendum).
- However, the most recent data signal slowdown risks in capex and trade.
- NWM GDP forecasts: 1.4% in 2018 & 1.6% in 2019 (vs long-run average ~2¼%).



Source: ONS, NatWest Markets



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# Brexit | Deal or No Deal

Financial markets have failed to distinguish between the **'Withdrawal Agreement'** and the **'Future Framework'**.

## **Withdrawal Agreement (WA):**

- Concerns the constitutional & financial mechanics of EU exit (including 'divorce bill' & citizen's rights).
- 80-90% agreed. The border with Ireland/customs arrangements, the main outstanding issue, can be fudged – or given existing positions on future economic relations/customs arrangements simply accept a hard border).
- WA merely requires the EU to 'take account' of future relations, a detailed blueprint is not required at this stage.
- We expect a WA to be reached in autumn 2018 (18th October 2018 EU Summit at the earliest, 13-14th December 2018 EU Summit at the latest). Detailed negotiations on FF to follow, during transition period (to end-2020). We expect a 'harder Brexit': a Canada-type free trade agreement.

## **Future Framework (FF):**

- Concerns a future 'trade deal' or extent of access to the Single European Market (SEM).
- Relatively little agreement on FF. EU27 has pushed back against various aspects of the UK's White Paper. Fundamental trade-off between SEM access and national sovereignty lies at the heart of the dilemma.
- UK Gov't seemingly putting higher priority on a quasi-SEM arrangement for goods rather than services access. The logic of the UK Government's 'red lines' and the EU27's stance on the integrity of the SEM is a 'harder Brexit' (a more limited 'Canada-plus' free trade agreement rather than an 'EEA' high-SEM access settlement).



# Brexit | Impact

- UK Treasury study of the long-term impact on the UK economy of EU membership and the alternatives (April 2016).
- **‘EEA’** outcome would be a ‘Norway’ type deal, with a high degree of EU single market access (including financial services).
- **‘Bilateral’** agreement would be akin to a ‘Canada’ or ‘Switzerland’ type free trade agreement.
- **‘WTO’** is a ‘no deal’ outcome (tariffs on goods, no deal in services) – the hardest realistic Brexit.

Annual impact of leaving the EU on the UK after 15 years (difference from being in the EU)

	EEA	Negotiated bilateral agreement	WTO
GDP level (%) – central	-3.8	-6.2	-7.5
GDP level (%)	-3.4 to -4.3	-4.6 to -7.8	-5.4 to -9.5
GDP per capita – central <sup>a</sup>	-£1,100	-£1,800	-£2,100
GDP per capita <sup>a</sup>	-£1,000 to -£1,200	-£1,300 to -£2,200	-£1,500 to -£2,700
GDP per household – central <sup>a</sup>	-£2,600	-£4,300	-£5,200
GDP per household <sup>a</sup>	-£2,400 to -£2,900	-£3,200 to -£5,400	-£3,700 to -£6,600
Net impact on receipts	-£20 billion	-£36 billion	-£45 billion

<sup>a</sup> Expressed in terms of 2015 GDP in 2015 prices, rounded to the nearest £100.

Source: HM Treasury




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# Brexit Risks | CapEx

- Economically, Brexit risks are centred most immediately on the corporate sector and capex.
- Business investment is one of the most cyclical components of GDP and previous downturns show an average peak-to-trough decline of 17.6%. . . At an average annual pace of 8.2%.
- **An 8% fall in capex would wipe almost 1½% points off GDP growth – i.e. the bulk of a full year's growth.**

**Business Investment during downturns  
where t = peak level of capex**




Source: ONS, NatWest Markets



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# UK Inflation | Is There a Problem?

- ‘GDP expenditure deflators’ (gauges of inflation) show UK import price inflation peaking at 10.2% y/y in Q1 2017, falling to 2.2%% in Q2 2018.
- The overall GDP deflator – which correlates closely with CPI inflation – is running at 1.7%, **implying ‘domestic’ inflation is close to 1.5% - hardly troubling levels.**
- Implied domestic inflation has been trending up since 2017. . . but from negative rates and remains at subdued levels which are not obviously consistent with a CPI overshoot.



Source: ONS, NatWest Markets




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# UK Inflation | Domestic Pressures Subdued

- **‘Domestic-demand determined’ services inflation** – strips out components which are more exogenous or administratively-determined (e.g. rail fares, university tuition fees).
- Our measure of domestic-demand determined services inflation has tended to run materially below total services inflation and remains close to historic lows.




Source: ONS, NatWest Markets



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# UK Inflation | Domestic Pressures Subdued

- We forecast CPI to return to target in Q3 2019 and remain close to its 2% target during the remainder of 2019 and 2020.
- Underlying inflation pressures continue to look subdued – little evidence of any material pick up in wage inflation and survey data suggesting that pricing power remains constrained **point to an undershoot of BoE forecasts.**
- BoE forecasts rest on contentious – or at least inconclusive – notions that slack continues to be eroded as a result of potential supply growth being as low as 1½%.




Source: ONS, NatWest Markets



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# UK Bank Rate | How High Can it Go?

- UK household debt-servicing costs at multi-decade lows (>50% of the stock of mortgage debt is at fixed rates of interest, 2-3 years typically).
- **NWM CENTRAL SCENARIO:** Includes 25bp rise in Bank Rate to 0.75% in Aug 2018. Debt-servicing costs remain some way below long-run averages.
- Bank Rate would need to rise to 1.5% (100bp of increases) to take debt-servicing up to decade averages.



Source: ONS, NatWest Markets



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# An American Cycle

**Giles Gale**

Head of European Rates Strategy

# Theme 1 | Neutral Rates are much lower

Lower rates are here to stay. The good news is that it might not get worse





Figure 6: Secular drivers of global real interest rates





Source: BIS, ONS



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# Theme 2 | Inflation won't be easy to keep down

## More inflation though?




Source: BIS, ONS



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# Theme 3 | Global (central bank) liquidity not growing. Concerned?




Source: NatWest Markets, ECB



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# Theme 3 | Global (central bank) liquidity. US only region tightening.

More \$ upside coming...



Another problem for the world is that FOMC sensitivity to EM downside, may be likely lower than in past cycles => higher than expected US rates, lower than expected global (ex US) risk assets

Source: NatWest Markets FX Strategy, Bloomberg




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


# Theme 4 | The US is asking the questions now. Is this time different?

US was already leading the world



Is now aided by the continual fiscal ease, that is SUPPLY Driven



Source: <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53651-outlook.pdf>




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# Theme 4 | The US is asking the questions now. Is this time different?


## 10s30s US curve has flattened and flattened



## But long-term rates are rising in the US... more to come?



## US pensions have been pouring money into duration... judging by stripping activity. Will that outlast the tax incentive?




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
Source: <https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53651-outlook.pdf>

# Theme 5 | How might the 'structural short' in the UK develop?

The structural short will shrink. A bit.



But for Inflation-Linked it may collapse!



Source: BIS, ONS



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# Key Themes

## Long term and global:

**Theme 1** | Neutral Rates are much lower ...

**Theme 2** | ... but the forces pushing real rates lower may be more inflationary

## Medium-term and cyclical:

**Theme 3** | Global central bank liquidity is no longer growing, but financial conditions are very easy

**Theme 4** | The US is driving the world economy, and the yield curve

## Local and structural:

**Theme 5** | The 'structural short' in the UK will remain very big. But inflation linkage may be less in-demand.






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# Implications for Insurers

**Andrew Kenyon FIA**

Insurance Origination & Solutions

# Insurers | Bulk Annuity Market Volumes




Source: Company press releases, LCP, Hymans Robertson, buy-ins and buy-outs



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# Assets | Annuity Funds



Source: SFCRs, Annual Reports, FY20 estimate based on “Solvency II one year in”, PRA Feb-17



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# Assets | Scrambled NNEGs...



BANK OF ENGLAND

## Speech

**'An annuity is a very serious business'<sup>1</sup>**

Speech given by  
David Rule, Executive Director of Insurance Supervision

Bulk Annuities – The Expanding Market, Westminster and City  
26 April 2018




BANK OF ENGLAND  
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION  
AUTHORITY

Consultation Paper | CP13/18  
**Solvency II: Equity release  
mortgages**  
July 2018





# Assets | Putting all your NNEG's in one basket...



Source: David Rule, "An annuity is a very serious business", 26-Apr-2018



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# Assets | What about inflation?



- BoE suggest **house prices** could fall by as much as **35% over 3 years** following a “no-deal” Brexit<sup>1</sup>
- **Higher inflation**, if correlated to house prices may help correct this
- Inflation **exposures other than RPI** are more difficult to hedge
- More insurers are **lending directly** to borrowers who are prepared to link repayments to **LPI** (i.e. capped / floored inflation) or **CPI**

Source: (1) Mark Carney, 14-Sep-2018



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# Liabilities | Risk Margin




Source: <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/prd/Documents/publications/reports/idr181017.pdf>



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# Liabilities | Risk Margin

- Risk margins for annuity writers **increase by 40%-50%** for a **100bps fall in interest rates**, which the PRA believes to be excessive<sup>1</sup>



Source: (1) David Rule, "A 'D to Z' of current issues in Insurance Supervision", 26-Sep-2018



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# Risk Margin | EIOPA Advice

- Allowing for **hedgeability** of **longevity** risk
  - “It is not clear why the reference undertaking should apply more (or less) risk-mitigation than the original undertaking.”
- **Alternatives** to EIOPA / SII:
  - Current IFRS – addition of prudence, not RM
  - IFRS 17 – what should RM look like?

Source: EIOPA's advice to the European Commission on specific items in the Solvency II Delegated Regulation



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# Risk Margin | PRA Ambitions

“Many hours have been spent highlighting the **biblical scale** of the **reporting requirements**, the **wickedness** of the **risk margin calculations**, the **mystical nature** of the Ultimate Forward Rate...

I could extend this list tenfold”

**Sam Woods, Deputy Governor and CEO, PRA**



Source: ABI Annual Conference – 27-Feb-2018



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# Risk Margin | PRA Ambitions


- Further discussion on the PRA's supervisory approach to use of future **risk mitigation and transfer mechanisms**
- Solvency II allows the use of these in a number of contexts, **including** the calculation of the **risk margin**
- Response to **proposals** by firms that are currently reinsuring **longevity risk** on a substantial portion of **new business**

Source: Sam Woods, letter to the Treasury Select Committee, 27-Mar-2018



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# Risk Margin | Longevity Risk



$$RM = 6\% \sum_i SCR_i \cdot df_i$$

$$SCR_i \approx \sum_{j>i} K_j \cdot \frac{df_j}{df_i}$$

$$RM \approx 6\% \sum_i \sum_{j>i} K_j \cdot df_{j_i}$$





# Risk Margin | PRA Ambitions

- The current design of the risk margin is **too sensitive** to the level of interest rates
- The use of **future risk mitigation and transfer mechanisms...** has **some merit** as a solution
- In the context of the **ongoing uncertainty** about our future relationship with the EU... we do not yet see a durable way to implement a change

Source: Sam Woods, letter to the Treasury Select Committee, 04-Jun-2018



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# Summary

## 1 Low interest rates

- Persistent burden of the **risk margin**
- Higher cost of **options and guarantees** (including NNEG)

## 2 Rising inflation

- Greater need to **reduce exposure** (particularly LPI, CPI)

## 3 Direct Investments

## 4 FX



# Questions

# Comments

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